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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH in the 
interest of 
STATE OF UTAH 
KENNETH EUGENE MARQUEZ 
A person under eighteen 
years of age. 
Case No. 
14571 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Th€' oppellant, Kenneth Eugene Marquez, appeals from 
an Qr,Jr'r of lhe Second District Juvenile Court for Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, dated April 12, 1976, committing Mr. 
Marquez, a juvenile, to the Utah State Industrial School. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks an order of this Court affirming the 
decision and order rendered by the Juvenile Court. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On November 2, 1975, Mr. John G. Cowan left his 
home at 10:00 o'clock in the morning. When he left, all 
windows and doors were secure. On his return at approximately 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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9: 00 p.m., he discovered that the back door had been forceci 
open, the garage window had been punched out and several 
items of value were missing. On November 3, 197 5, Officer 
Thompson of the Salt Lake City Police Department observed 
what appeared to be fingerprints on the garage window, and 
he requested that they be processed by the Police Crime 
Lab. On November 4, 1975, Officer Simpson lifted the print; 
from the window, and later conclusively identified the prin: 
as belonging to the appellant. A trial was held on March H. 
1976, where the appellant offered no evidence in his own 
behalf. Judge Regnal W. Garff, Jr., found the allegat~m 
of burglary and theft true beyond a reasonable doubt, and 
ordered the cippellant committed to the Utah State Industria: 
School. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE JUVENILE COURT DID NOT ERR IN ADMITTING INTO 
EVIDENCE FINGERPRINT RECORDS OF THE ACCUSED WITHOUT REQUIRr 
THAT A FOUNDATION BE LAID TO SHOW 'rHAT SUCH FINGERPRINTS 
WERE OBTAINED IN COMPLIANCE WITH UTAH STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
AND JUVENILE COURT RULES. 
Utah Code Ann. § 55-10-116 (1953), provides that 
"Without consent of the [juvenile court] judge, no fingerpr 
-2-
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" 
shall be taken of any child taken into custody. 
Appellant asks this Court to adopt rules of law which 
would require the State to lay a foundation showing 
compliance with the above statute before fingerprint 
evidence may be admitted in evidence in a juvenile court 
proceeding. Appellant has asserted that such a rule is 
the only means available to enforce the statute, and 
that in the absence of a sufficient foundation, the 
evidence must be conclusively presumed to have been 
illegally obtained. Appellant's argument is premised 
on the notion that fingerprint evidence obtained in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 55-10-116 (1953), as 
amended, would be inadmissible in court proceedings. 
Respondent respectfully submits that the adoption of 
the above rule on such reasoning would be unwise, 
unnecessary and co~trary to public policy. 
Appellant has admitted that there is no recognized 
case law on this subject, but has quoted Davis v. Mississippi, 
394 U.S. 721 (1969), in support of the proposition that 
fingerprint evidence obtained illegally is inadmissible in 
a state court. More precisely stated, the holding in that 
case is that a suspect may not be detained in violation of 
-3-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution, and that fingerprint evidence obtained as a 
result of that illegal detention is "tainted" and inadmis-
sible. The Court did not hold that the taking of fingerprin: 
was a search or seizure subject to Fourth Amendment limita-
tions, and specifically found "no occasion in this case .. , 
to determine whether the requirements of the Fourth Amendment 
could be met by narrowly circumscribed procedures for obtain· 
ing, during the course of a criminal investigation, the 
fingerprints of individuals for whom there is no probable 
cause to arrest." Davis at 728. It has been held that 
absent an illegal detention, there is no basis for objecting 
to the admission of fingerprint evidence. Redd v. Decker, 
447 F.2d 1346 (5th Cir. 1971). Voluntary submission to 
fingerprinting has been held a waiver of any Fourth Amendmer 
rights, People v. Hannaman, 507 P.2d 466 (Colo. 1973), and 
it has been held that fingerprints may be taken absent a 
warrant or arrest, State v. Dillon, 93 Idaho 698, 471 P.2d 
553 (1970). Despite the slim authority available for the 
proposition that fingerprints are subject to Fourth Arnendme 
protections, appellant contends that fingerprint evidence 
should not be admitted even if it is obtained by procedures 
-4-
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that comport with constitutional commands. Appellant is 
urging that Utah Code Ann. § 55-10-116 (1953), supplies 
an additional and independent ground for the exclusion of 
evidence. Such a rule would be analogous to the present 
"exclusionary rule" only in its draconian effect of denying 
to the courts relevant evidence. The rule would be based 
not on the requirements of constitutional construction, but 
rather on implication from the statute, and it is a hazardous 
guess at best that the legislature would have afforded juveniles 
the protection found in the statute at the cost of allowing 
juvenile offenders to escape punishment. Fashioning a rule 
as pr,1yed for by appellant would constitute an unwarranted 
incur:;ion into the legislative sphere. 
Contrary to appellant's contention, an exclusionary 
rule JS not the only, or even the best, means of enforcing 
Utah Code Ann. § 55-10-116 (1953). A juvenile who felt 
that his fingerprints had been unlawfully taken or filed 
should be able to bring an action to compel destruction of 
the record. Davidson v. Dill, 180 Colo. 123, 503 P.2d 157 
(1972); Eddy v. Moore, 5 wash.App. 334, 487 P.2d 211 (1971); 
and Menard v. Mitchell, 430 F.2d 486 (D.C. 1970). Such an 
an action would be analogous to a proceeding to restore 
property improperly seized under a warrant. Utah Code Ann. § 
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77-54-18 (1953). This procedure would give a remedy to 
all juveniles wrongfully fingerprinted, not just to those 
returned to court under suspicion of misbehavior; but it 
would not forbid a court to receive relevant evidence. A 
process for destruction of records under court order would 
also have a greater deterrent effect on official misconduct 
than an exclusionary rule. Under an exclusionary rule, the 
police could keep an illegally obtained set of fingerpri~s 
for comparison purposes, obtain probable cause for an arm: 
from those fingerprints, and then take an admissible set of 
prints at th<' time of the arrest. It is precisely this typ, 
of c i i-cular procedure which led Justice Stewart to characte: 
the [}avis decision as a "useless gesture." Davis at 730. 
The conviction in the Davis case was eventually affirmed, 
see Davis v. State, 255 So.2d 916 (Miss. 1971), cert.~ 
409 U.S. 855 (1972). See also Bynum v. United States, 262 
F.2d 465 (D.C. 1959), and 274 F.2d 767 (D.C. 1960). T~ 
harmful effects of a rule that excludes relevant evide~e 
from a court proceeding has long been recognized. As Chief 
Justice Burger said: 
"The history of the suppression doctrine 
demonstrates that it is both conceptually 
sterile and practically ineffective in , 
accomplishing its stated objective. · · · 
Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Ag~~ 
403 U.S. 388, 415 (1970). 
-6-
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Accordingly, the Supreme Court has resisted efforts to 
expand the scope of the exclusionary rule. See Stone v. 
Powell, 44 U.S.L.W. 5313 (U.S. July 6, 1976), holding that 
where a state has provided a full and fair litigation of a 
Fourth Amendment claim, a convict is not entitled to 
federal habeas corpus relief on the grounds of an uncon-
stitutional search; United States v. Jains, 44 U.S.L.W. 
5303 (U.S. July 6, 1976), holding that the exclusionary 
rule does not apply to forbid the use in the civil proceedings 
of one sovereign the evidence seized by an agent of another 
sovereign. State court decisions have been consistent with 
this trend to limit the scope of the exclusionary rule, 
i.e., People v. Coleman, 120 Cal.Rptr. 384, 533 P.2d 1024 
(1975), stating that the exclusionary rule is not applicable 
to parole revocation hearings. 
In addition to expanding the substantive scope 
of the exclusionary rulP, appellant has urged its adoption 
in an ,·entirely one-sided procedural framework. Ordinarily, 
a criminal defendant cannot require a prosecutor to "lay a 
foundation" to show that all evidence that he intends to 
admit was legally obtained. Evidence obtained in violation 
of constitutional rights is kept out of court by means of 
0 motion to suppress, and the defendant has the burden of 
-7-
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showing a prima facie case of unreasonable search and 
seizure to support his motion. United States v. 
Warrington, 17 F.R.D. 25 (N.D. Cal. 1955); People v. 
Manning, 33 Cal.App. 586, 109 Cal.Rptr. 531 (1973); and 
People v. Valdez, 173 Colo. 410, 480 P.2d 574 (1971). 
As this Court said in State v. Montayne, 18 Utah 2d 
38, 414 P.2d 958 (1966), cert. denied 385 U.S. 939: 
"Evidence is suppressed or 
excluded only if the same was obtained 
by a violation of the Fourth Amendment 
. . • Therefore it is entirely proper 
to require of one who seeks to challenge 
the legality of a search as a basis for 
suppressing relevant evidence that he 
alleges, and if the allegation be dis-
puted, that he establish that he himself 
was a victim of an invasion of privacy." 
In the present case, the appellant has not produced a 
scintilla of evidence that the fingerprint record was 
obtained in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 55-10-116 (1953) 
There are, in fact, indications that the fingerpr 
record was obtained in 0n entirely legal fashion. The 
fingerprint card is dated as having been made on June 20, 
19 7 3. The rule governing the taking of f ingerpr in ts at th 
time was General Order No. 3, Rule 39, Utah Juvenile court 
Rules of Practice and Procedure, which provided: 
-8-
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"IT IS HEREBY ORDERED by the 
Judges of the Utah State Juvenile 
Court that duly appointed and acting 
law enforcement officers in the State 
of Utah may take the fingerprints of 
any person under the age of eighteen 
years, which such officer has lawfully 
taken into custody: 
1. When such person has committed 
one of the following acts: 
(a) Any offense which would be a 
felony if committed by an adult. 
(b) Any offense that would be 
petit larceny if committed by an adult. 
(c) Any offense of depriving a 
motor vehicle owner of possession. 
(d) Any offense involving a 
sexual exhibition. 
(e) Running away from home without 
the consent of parents or guardian. 
2. In any other case when such 
person has been lawfully taken into 
custody upon sufficient evidence tending 
lo connect said person with the commission 
of an offense that would be a crime if 
committed by an adult, and fingerprints 
are reasonably necessary for comparison 
with latent prints obtained at the crime 
scene to further establish that said person 
perpetrated the offense or that he is innocent 
of the offense." 
The fingerprint card indicates that it was taken incident to 
an arrest for "Auto Theft" and "Run A-way," and is clearly 
within the above rule. The later rule which requires the 
destruction of records of arrest not resulting in action 
by the court, U.J.C.R.P.P. Rule 39 (1975), was not in effect 
at the time the fingerprint record was made, and according 
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to accepted rules of construction, it should not be given 
a retroactive interpretation so as to require the destruc-
tion of records already filed. Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-3 
(1953). 
The fact that the record was in official cust~y~ 
was not destroyed gives rise to the presumption that the 
officers were under no duty to destroy it. Contrary to 
appellant's contention, where the record is silent, officers 
are conclusively presumed to have performed their duty. 
Utah Liquor Control Comm' n v. District Court of the Seventr. 
Judicial District, 100 Utah 135, 111 P.2d 144 (1941); 
People v_ Co~Jins, 172 Cal.App.2d 295, 342 P.2d 370 (1959):] 
and f'aint_er v_. Peyton, 257 F.Supp. 913 (E.D. Virginia 1966). 
As this Court has said, ". . . peace officers shoul' 
not be unduly hampered in legitimate attempts to investigate 
crimes and to seek out and identify those who have corrm1itte: 
them." State v. Perry, 27 Utah 2d 48, 492 P.2d 1349 (19721. 
Exclusion of fingerprint evidence in this case would clearli, 
hamper police activity without providing a corresponding 
benefit. For the reasons stated above, respondent 
respectfully submits that the Juvenile Court committed 
no error in the admission of the fingerprint evidence. 
-10-
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POINT II 
THE JUVENILE COURT DID NOT ERR AS A MATTER 
OF LAW IN ADMITTING FINGERPRINT EVIDENCE AS AN EXCEPTION 
TO THE HEARSAY RULE. 
Appellant contends that fingerprint evidence 
is inadmissible hearsay unless authenticated by the 
officer who made the record, and has cited People v. 
Zirbes, 6 Cal. 2d 425, 57 P.2d 1319 (1936) as authority. 
However, it is no longer the law of California that 
fingerprint records are inadmissible as hearsay. 
People v. Crosslin, 251 Cal. App. 968, 60 Cal. Rptr. 
309 (1967). That court held fingerprint cards ad-
missible under the Uniform Business Records as 
Evidence Act. In almost every American jurisdiction, 
properly authenticated fingerprint records are 
admissible in evidence as an exception to the 
hearsay rule. Brown v. People,124. Colo. 412, 238 
P.2d 847 (1951); State v. Morris, 222 La. 480, 620 
So. 2d G4CJ (1953); Brown v. State, 413 S.W. 2d 922 
(Tex. C£im. 1967); State v. Gagallarritti, 377 S.W. 
2d 298 (Mo. 1964); State v. O'Neal, 204 Kan. 226, 
461 P.2d 801 (1969); Plunkett v. State, 437 P.2d 
92 (Nev. 1968). This court has held police "rap 
sheets" admissible as exceptions to the hearsay rule. 
-11-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Price v. Turner, 28 U.2d 328, 502 P.2d 121 (1972). 
The fingerprint card as offered in evidence satis-
fied the requirements of both the business records 
exception to the hearsay rule URE 63(13), and the 
reports of persons exclusively authorized exception 
URE 63(16). Statutory authorization for making 
fingerprints is found in Utah Code Annotated 
§§ 77-59-9, 77-59-29 (1953). Utah Code Annotated 
§ 77-59-26 provides that: 
"Any copy of a . . . finger-
print . . • in the files of the 
bureau (of criminal identification) 
certified by the director to be 
a true copy of the original, shall 
be admissible in evidence in any 
court of this state in the same 
manner as the original might be." 
This necessarily implies that original fingerprint 
records are admissible without direct testimony 
by the officer who made them. 
As Dean Wi';i'10re has said: 
"'Ilic purpose and reason of the 
hears--1y rule is the key to the ex-
ceptions to it. 
'Ile theory of the hearsay rule 
is that the many possible sources 
of inaccuracy and untrustworthiness 
which may lie underneath the bare 
untested assertion of a witness 
can best be brought to light and 
exposed, if they exist, by the 
-12-
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I 
............_ 
test of cross-examination. But 
this test or security may in a 
given instance be superfluous; 
it may be sufficiently clear, in 
that instance, that the statement 
offered is free enough from the 
risk of inaccuracy and untrustworth-
iness, so that the test of cross-
examination would be a work of 
supererogation." 5 Wigmore, Evidence 
§ 1420 (Chadbourn rev. 1974). 
In applying this testto firgerprint records, the 
following result is obtained: 
"In evidencing the identity 
of a party to the case with some 
other person, how may finger-
print records kept elsewhere be 
evidenced? . . the official record 
of such prints, kept under authority 
express or implied, is admissible," 
2 Wigmore, Evidence § 414a (3d. 
Ed. 1940) 
Respon<1cnt respectfully submits that the juvenile 
coud ''.; adrnission of the fingerprint record as an 
excr'11tion lo the hearsay rule was based on sound 
and recogni~cd principles of law, and as such 
constituted no error. 
POINT III 
A SUFFICIENT FOUNDATION WAS LAID FOR THE 
ADMISSION OF THE FINGERPRINT RECORD AS AN EXCEPTION 
TO THE HEARSAY RULE. 
Appellant has cited two Utah cases which 
demonstrate the proper rule as to the foundational 
requirement for the admission of evidence under 
the business records exception to the hearsay rule. 
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State v. Davie, 121 Utah 189, 240 P.2d 265 (1952) 
and Clayton v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 96 
Utah 331, 85 P.2d 819 (1938). Appellant has correctly 
isolated the elements of a proper foundation from 
these cases: the records must be made "in the 
usual course of business", they must be "generally 
authenticated", they must be introduced from 
proper custody, and there must be a showing of 
necessity for the introduction of the evidence with-
out requiring the person who made the print to 
testify. Appellant has not indicated which of these 
foundational requirements he feels is unsatisfied. 
Officer Simpson testified that he was employed as 
a finqerpri11t technician for six years (T.15), that 
fin-1•'t"!'':i111 1·,:.irds are made during the regular course 
of "busine:;,;" at the Salt Lake City Police Department 
(T.17), that these cards are filed under the "Henry 
System" at the Police Departments Identification 
Bureau, that he recognized the card introduced 
as Exhibit #1 as a card used at the Police Depart-
ment, and that he obtained the card from the Finger-
print File (T.18,19). Such testimony is sufficient 
to satisfy the requirements that the record be made 
in the regular course of business, and that it be 
generally authenticated. In Norchcrest Inc. v. 
Walker Bank & Trust Co., 122 Utah 268, 248 P.2J 
692 (1952), this court held that a bank officer 
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was competent to testify as to bank records and 
their contents, even though he was not associated 
with the bank until some years after the transaction 
in question had occurred. The fact that he was 
familiar with bank records made concurrent with 
the transaction was sufficient to qualify him 
as a witness. The witness testified that the 
fingerprint card was obtained from the files 
of the Salt Lake City Police Department. This 
is sufficient to establish proper custody, and 
a fingerprint technician is competent to testify 
a~ a custodian. Lester v. State, 416 P.2d 
52, 58-SS (Okla. Crim. 1966). When a fingerprint 
record has been produced from official custody, a 
sufficient foundation has been laid for its admission. 
State v. Polson, 93 Idaho 912, 478 P.2d 292 cert. 
denied 402 U.S. 930 (1971). 
Tlte appro: ,- ia te degree of necessity required 
to be slln1-:n in or, . ·r Lo admit a record made under 
an expt-c'sc; statut···/ dt:ty is something less than 
absolute impossibility. The fact that public officers 
have more important duties than the verification of 
the records they have made is most often regarded 
as sufficient to satisfy the necessity requirement. 
5 Wigmore, Evidence§ 1631 (Chadbourn Rev. 1974). 
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In addition, although counsel for the 
appellant objected to the admission of the records 
on the grounds of an insufficient showing of com-
pliance with statute, and on the ground that an 
insufficient chain of custody was established, no 
objection was made to the introduction of the 
evidence on the ground that an insufficient founda-
tion had been laid for their admission under the 
business records exception. Appellant should not 
be heard to complain for the first time on appeal 
that an insufficient foundation was laid when no 
such objection was presented in the juvenile court. 
People v. Lopez, 60 Cal. 2d 223 1 384 P.2d 16, 32 
Cal. Rptr. 424 (1963) cert. denied 375 U.S. 994 
(1964). 
Respondents respectfully submit that the 
juvenile court cownitted no error in admitting the 
evidence on the foundation shown. 
POINT IV 
A CHAIN OF CUSTODY WAS SUFFICIENTLY ESTABLISHED 
TO INSURE THE AUTHENTICITY OF THE FINGERPRINT CARD 
ADMITTED INTO EVIDENCE. 
Appellant has cited a number of cases involving 
the admissibility of narcotics as evidence, and has 
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stated that the "chain of custody" requirements 
for that type of evidence is clearly analogous 
to the case at bar. The rationale for the chain 
of custody requirement was specified by this 
court in State v. Madsen, 28 U.2d 108, 498 P.2d 
670 (1972), where it was stated that a physical 
object or substance must be shown to be in sub-
stantially the same condition as at the time of the 
criminal act before it would be admissible in a 
court of law. The court in that case propounded 
the factors it would consider in determining 
whether that showing had been made: circumstances 
surrounding the preservation and custody of the 
object, ancl the likelihood of tampering. Finally, 
the CnLirt lwlc1 in Madsen that the determination 
c1s t ,, 1.'lll'tl1,.r_- a sufficient chain of custody had been 
establis~cd w~s in the first instance for the trial 
court to make, and that such finding would not be 
disturbed on appeal absent a clear abuse of discre-
tion. All of the above factors undercut appellants 
assignment of error. 
First, an inked fingerprint card held in the 
files of a police identification bureau is not even 
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slightly analogous to narcotics evidence. An 
inked fingerprint can no more change over a period 
of time so as to resemble another fingerprint 
than an ink signature can cease to be unique. 
Unlike a signature, a fingerprint cannot be forged. 
An inked fingerprint card is not physical evidence, 
but is essentially documentary in nature. Docu-
ments do not need to be placed in sealed envelopes 
to guarantee their integrity. In addition to being 
virtually impossible to create a spurious finger-
print, appellant has not demonstrated any credible 
motive on the part of any individual who had access 
to the records for attempting to do so. In this 
si ttJL! ti on, l lie likelihood of tampering is essentially 
zero. The circumstances surrounding the custody 
of the card are equally unassailable. As stated 
above, the introduction of a fingerprint card 
from official custody is held to be a sufficient 
foundation to guarantee accuracy. Polson, supra. 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-25-3 (1953), provides 
that: 
"Entries in public or other 
official books or records, made 
in the performance of his duty 
by a public officer of this 
state or by any other person in 
the performance of a duty specially 
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enjoined by the law, are prima 
facie evidence of the facts stated 
therein." 
As stated above, the duty to take fingerprints is 
specifically required by Utah Code Annotated 
§§ 77-59-9' 77-59-29 (1953). 
Respondent is unaware of any authority 
pertinent to the question of the appropriate chain 
of custody requirement for fingerprint records, 
but can suggest a more useful analogy than narcotics 
evidence. There are a few cases that deal with 
th~ necessary chain of custody for latent finger-
prints to be admissible as evidence. In State v. 
Viola, Ohio , 82 N.E. 2d 306 the chain of 
custody was held to be sufficiently shOWn even though 
the evidence was not held in a sealed envelope. 
In Eades v. State, 232 Ga. 735, 208 S.E. 2d 791 
(1974), the testimony of a police officer that the 
prints never left r,olice custody was held sufficient 
to establi'.oh a chain or custody, and in People v. 
Riser, 47 Cal. 2d 'JG6, 105 P.2d 1, cert. denied 
353 U.S. 930 (1957) it was held not error to admit 
a latent fingerprint into evidence, even where it 
had been left in an unlocked office without a showing 
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how the fingerprint could have been forged or 
that they had been tampered with. The chain 
of custody requirement for fingerprint records 
was met and exceeded in the instant case. As 
Dean Wigmore has stated in 7 Wiqmore Evidence 
(3d Ed. 1940) § 2158: 
"When in a government 
office are kept permanent 
records under the custody of 
an officer appointed to that 
duty, there is commonly little 
danger in inferring that records 
found there existing are genuine. 
It would be difficult as well 
as criminal to substitute or to 
insert false records. More-
over, the usual mode of authen-
ticating such documents (as by 
proving the clerk's or officer's 
handwriting) would be both highly 
inconvenient, on account of its 
repeated necessity, and also often 
impossible, on account of the 
change of officials as well as 
the antiquity of many portions 
of the records. 
It seems, therefore, never 
to hav• heen doubted that the 
existe,,ce of an official document 
in the crpropriate official custody 
is sufficient evidence of its 
genuinPness to go to the jury." 
Respondent respectfully submits that the 
juvenile court corru~itted no error in allowing the 
fingerprint record into evidence. 
POINT V 
THE JUVENILE COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING 
APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR A DISMISSAL BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE 
WAS SUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH DEFENDANT'S GUILT BEYOND 
A REASONABLE DOUBT. 
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Appellant contends that there is insufficient 
evidence to support the juvenile courts verdict. 
Respondent submits that a review of the record will 
show the verdict to be amply supported. It is 
uncontested that the evidence indicates a burglary 
and theft was committed on the date in question. 
Uncontradicted evidence offered by the State estab-
lished that the garage window was punched out and 
placed inside the garage on the same date as the 
burglarious entry. (T.6). Fingerprints were dis-
covered on the window on the day after the burglary 
(T.14). These prints were lifted and found con-
elusively to be those of the appellent (T.29). 
The· .q>rclL1n t was unknown to the victim of the 
bui•;\.11-y, ._111•\ no evidence was offered to explain 
the 1•re:;1~rw« of appellant's prints at the scene of 
the crir11c. 
The appropriate test to be applied in this 
circumstance was discussed by this court in State v. 
Sullivan, 6 Utah 2d 110, 307 P.2d 212 cert. denied 
355 U.S. 848 (1957): 
"[l] The defendants essay to 
demonstrate that the evidence leaves 
such doubt as to their identification 
as the culprits in this crime that 
they were entitled to a dismissal. 
For them to prevail on that pro-
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position it must appear that, 
viewing the evidence and all fair 
inferences reasonably to be 
drawn therefrom in the light most 
favorable to the jury's verdict, 
reasonable minds could not believe 
them guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt, but would necessarily enter-
tain some substantial doubt of 
their guilt .... the practical 
exigencies of crime detection and 
prosecution are to reckoned with 
and allowance made for the fact 
that proof beyond all peradventure 
of doubt could seldom be had. Nor 
does the law require it. It is to 
be borne in mind that most crimes, 
and particularly burglary, are 
committed with whatever stealth 
and cunning the perpetrator can 
devise to escape detection and 
identification. All law enforce-
ment officers and those victim-
ized can do is to make such ob-
servations and piece together such 
evidence as they are able to obtain 
an~ if it warrants doing so, present 
i• to courts and juries. The 
standard which must be met is only 
that proof of guilt be established 
l"'yond a reasonable doubt. Where 
circumstances otherwise strongly 
suggest guilt, the doubt should 
be real and substantial and not one 
that is merely possible or imaginary." 
6 Utah 2d at 112, 114. 
Respondent submits that the burden was met 
in this case. 
In State v. Washington, 17 Utah 2d 149, 405 
P.2d 793 (1965) this court held that where finger-
print evidence was offered to connect a defendant 
with a burglary, and no explanation is offered 
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indicating anything other than guilt, the evidence 
is sufficient to support a guilty verdict. In 
Hervey v. People, 495 P.2d 204 (Colo. 1972), the 
court held that fingerprint evidence on a bottle 
found near the scene of a murder is sufficient to 
support a guilty verdict, where it appears that the 
fact-finder was convinced that the fingerprints 
were empressed at the time of the crime. In State 
v. Tew 234 N.C. 612, 688 S.E. 2d 291 (1951), where 
fingerprint evidence was discovered on a piece of 
glass inside a burglarized gas station, and the 
attendant testified that she had never seen the 
accused prior to the time of the crime, the evidence 
was held sufficient to present a question for the 
jury. In State v. Hanna, l Or. App. 110, 459 P.2d 
564, the court held that where defendants finger-
prints were found on a piece of glass located near 
a broker ~indow, th0 evidence was sufficient to 
support the infercrce that defendant was the person 
who entered the ha< ',c. 
The fact that the fingerprint was found on 
the garage window, and that there is no direct access 
from the garage to the house does not undercut the 
State's case. In People v. Lyles, 156 Cal. App. 
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2d 482, 319 P.2d 745 (1957), the court held that a 
defendant found in an adjacent but unconnected 
structure could be found guilty of attempted burg-
lary. Viewing the evidence and the inferences to 
be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable 
to the verdict, the fingerprints on the garage 
window were not so far removed from the admitted 
burglary and theft in terms of either space or 
time as to allow a reasonable doubt of the appellants 
guilt. 
Respondent respectfully submits that the 
evidence was sufficient to justify the trier of 
fact in finding the appellant guilty of burglary 
and theft beyond a reasonable doubt. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the facts, law and reasoning 
set forth herein, the decision and order of the 
Second District Ju'.'Pnile Court for Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, conunitting Mr. Marquez to 
the Utah State InC:u::trial School should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
EARL F. DORIUS 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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